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composition be deemed protectable under copyright law?  This 
Article argues that it should not be, and offers a new paradigm for 
the reevaluation of the role harmony plays in the substantial 
similarity test.  The Article contends that basic tonal harmonic 
progressions should be unprotectable as a matter of law because 
those progressions constitute a song’s functional feature.1  For 
example, a twelve-bar blues harmonic progression should be 
unprotectable not just because of the ubiquitous “public domain” 
argument, but because of the functional features the harmony 
possesses.2  The twelve-bar structure itself should be treated as a 
functional feature, because a composer may use the progression a 
dozen of times within one song to create the type of acoustic 
pattern listeners call “the blues.” 
Mass consumers demand music capable of being emulated by a 
vast number of people, and they demand music in which simple 
harmony is a prominent trait.3  Protecting simple harmonic 
material of one composer would hinder the ability of other 
composers to produce songs with the features demanded by music 
 1 Cristle Collins Judd, Studies on the Origin of Harmonic Tonality by Carl Dahlhaus: 
Robert O. Gjerdingen, 74 MUSIC & LETTERS 61 (1993) (book review).  Dahlhaus defines 
harmonic tonality as “the representation of a key by means of associations among chords 
related to a center.” Id.; see also Carl Dahlhaus, Harmony § 2(iv), in GROVE MUSIC 
ONLINE  [hereinafter GROVE], available at OXFORD MUSIC ONLINE [hereinafter OXFORD], 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/50818 (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2009). 
 2 The notion of the functionality of harmony, as it is understood in the musical 
context, is to be distinguished from functionality as the term is used in trademark 
doctrine. Compare infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (“Harmony is . . . 
functional, because it serves as a support for melody or for a melodic figuration.  
Harmony anchors the melody into the primary key which functions as a point of 
reference to a certain pitch class, accompanies the melody into the secondary keys, and 
provides an aural context in which the listener can better distinguish the character of the 
melody.”), with Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (“In 
general terms, a product feature is functional and cannot serve as a trademark, if it is 
essential to the use of purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article, 
that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage.” (citing Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 851 n.10 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 3 See generally RICHARD MIDDLETON, STUDYING POPULAR MUSIC 34–63 (1990) 
(discussing Adorno’s theory that popular music’s two essential elements are 
“standardization” and “pseudo-individualization”) [hereinafter MIDDLETON, STUDYING 
POPULAR MUSIC]; STEPHEN MILES, CONSUMERISM AS A WAY OF LIFE 110–11 (1998). 
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consumers.4  The idea of harmonic functionality has not been 
explored in the legal context, and this Article offers a novel 
rationale for the legal treatment of harmony that rests on the 
acoustical properties of sound and on the properties initially 
articulated by Pythagoras, later crystallized by Renaissance 
scholars, and subsequently refined by post-modernist music 
theoreticians.  The Article also moves to the principles of music 
theory and acoustic perception to suggest that the current 
expectations from juries in applying the intrinsic similarity test are 
unrealistic.  It explains that there are too many factors that impair 
juries’ ability to determine the intrinsic similarity between a 
composition and its alleged infringer.  All notions are analyzed in 
the context of the substantial similarity test. 
The novelty and advantage of the rationale proposed by this 
Article is that it accounts for the functional features of harmony, as 
the term “functional” is understood in trademark law.5  The 
approach explains the reasons why the simple harmony, which is 
inevitably tonal-functional, should generally be unprotectable.  The 
explanation involves an excursion into music theory and the 
acoustic nature of sound. 
I. THE TEST OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY AT A GLANCE 
If a plaintiff proves ownership of copyright, such as by 
showing a valid certificate of registration with the copyright 
office,6 and proves that the defendant copied protected 
 4 This is because mass consumers of music invariably demand basic harmonies as a 
feature in the songs. See MILES, supra note 3, at 122 (“The overall implication here is that 
the pop music industry is producing products that appeal to a mass market; products that 
conform to a standardized, rationalized formula and that, as such, pop music is 
irredeemably commercial.”). 
 5 See supra note 2 (distinguishing the term functional as it is understood in the context 
of tonal harmony and in the context of trademark doctrine). 
 6 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006) (“In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a 
registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in 
the certificate.”); Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (“A certificate of 
copyright constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership and originality of the work as a 
whole.”); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 851 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that registration 
with the copyright office raises presumption of originality under the Copyright Act). 
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compositional elements of the registered work, then the plaintiff 
has asserted a valid infringement claim.7  To demonstrate copying 
of the protected elements, the plaintiff must prove actual and 
actionable copying.8  Actual copying is proven by demonstrating 
that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s work and by a 
showing of probative similarity between the competing works.9  
Actionable copying is proven by satisfaction of the substantial 
similarity test.10 
The substantial similarity test itself varies among circuits.11  In 
the Ninth Circuit, the test first focuses on extrinsic or objective 
similarity,12 which is a question of law, and then upon intrinsic or 
 7 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (To 
succeed on a copyright infringement claim “two elements must be proven: (1) ownership 
of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are 
original.”); Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845 (“[T]he requirement is substantial similarity to 
protected elements of the copyrighted work. . . .”); 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 (MB 2008) (“Reduced to most fundamental 
terms, there are only two elements necessary to the plaintiff’s case in an infringement 
action: ownership of the copyright by the plaintiff and copying by the defendant.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 8 See Johnson, 409 F.3d at 20 (“[T]wo elements underpin[] Feist’s copying 
requirement: actual copying and actionable copying.”); Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We 
Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright 
Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1375, 1383–84 (2007) (“Proof of copying consists of 
two separate components[:] . . . whether copying occurred . . . [and] whether such 
copying is actionable (i.e., whether there was too much copying).”). 
 9 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 844 (“[Plaintiff] may establish copying by showing that 
[defendant] had access to [plaintiff’s song] and that [defendant’s song] was substantially 
similar to [plaintiff’s song] in [its] protected elements.”); see also Johnson, 409 F.3d at 
20 (“[Absent submission of] direct evidence of actual copying, [plaintiff] must support 
that element by indirect evidence demonstrating access and probative similarity.”). 
 10 See Johnson, 409 F.3d at 20; Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1384 (“In order for 
appropriation to be actionable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s work is 
substantially similar to plaintiff’s work such that defendant is liable for copyright 
infringement.  Substantial similarity is a conclusion; it is not a formula or test.”). 
 11 Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1385 (“There are two primary tests that most courts 
follow:  the ‘ordinary observer’ test associated with the Second Circuit or the two-part 
‘extrinsic-intrinsic’ test associated with the Ninth Circuit.”). 
 12 Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he extrinsic test is 
an objective measure of the ‘articulable similarities between the plot, themes, dialogue, 
mood, setting, pace, characters, and sequence of events.’”) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845; Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 
1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he ‘extrinsic’ test considers whether two works share a 
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subjective similarity, which is a question of fact for the jury.13  
Guided by the indicia of sufficient disagreement between two 
works, the extrinsic similarity test dissects both works measure-by-
measure, with the help of expert music theoreticians and 
composers, to ascertain whether the defendant has appropriated the 
specific protectable elements of the plaintiff’s work.14  Dissection 
spares no compositional component: melody, motifs, melodic 
contours, tonality, pitch emphasis, bass line, tempo, generic style, 
rhythm, ornamentation, harmony and lyrics.15  Past the extrinsic 
gate, the plaintiff faces the intrinsic similarity test, which simply 
asks the jury whether the total feel of the two works, in their 
ordinary and reasonable perception, are substantially similar.16 
In the First Circuit, the experts’ testimony is used to prove 
probative similarity, but is usually “not permitted to aid in the 
similarity of ideas and expression based on external, objective criteria.”); Roodhuyzen, 
supra note 8, at 1385. 
 13 See Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1385. 
 14 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845; Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 
(9th Cir. 2000); see also John R. Autry, Toward a Definition of Striking Similarity in 
Infringement Actions for Copyrighted Musical Works, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 113, 117–18 
(2002) (“[A]nalytic testimony, including the opinions of expert witnesses in the field, is 
not only helpful, but essential.” (citations omitted)); Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1385–
86. 
 15 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 849 (discussing the dissection test and its application in 
other courts); Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 485.  Other courts have discussed dissection with 
respect to additional components of musical compositions, including melody, harmony, 
rhythm, pitch, tempo, phrasing, structure, chord progressions, and lyrics. See, e.g., Ellis v. 
Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that the district court had compared 
idea, phraseology, lyrics, rhythms, chord progressions, “melodic contours,” structures, 
and melodies under the “ordinary observer” test); Cottrill v. Spears, No. 02-3646, 2003 
WL 21223846, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2003) (unpublished disposition) (comparing 
pitch, chord progression, meter, and lyrics under the extrinsic test); Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d 539, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (analyzing structure, melody, harmony, and rhythm 
under “striking similarity” test); McKinley v. Raye, No. 3:96-CV-2231-P, 1998 WL 
119540, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 1998) (analyzing lyrics, melodies, and song structure).  
Note, however, that historically courts afforded more protection to melody, harmony and 
rhythm. See 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.05(D) (“It has been said that a musical work 
consists of rhythm, harmony and melody, and that originality, if it exists, must be found 
in one of these.”). 
 16 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 847; Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 485; Autry, supra note 14, at 
117 (“[The] intrinsic test relies upon the observations of the ‘ordinary reasonable person,’ 
eschewing the analytic dissection and expert testimony which characterized the extrinsic 
test.” (citations omitted)); Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1385–86. 
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substantial similarity inquiry.”17  The greater the degree of 
probative similarity, the greater the likelihood of a finding of 
actual copying.18  The First Circuit, however, analyzes substantial 
similarity under the “ordinary observer” or “ordinary listener” 
test.19  Under the ordinary listener test an allegedly infringed work 
will be found to be substantially similar to a copyrighted work if an 
“ordinary person with reasonable attentiveness” concludes, after 
listening to both, that the former was unlawfully appropriated.20  
Practitioners must be aware that some courts vacillate between the 
use of the probative similarity and substantial similarity tests.  The 
two are not the same, since probative similarity is a threshold 
matter in showing actual copying, and substantial similarity is a 
comprehensive test for determining actionable copying.21  
Notwithstanding the nomenclature variances in the analyses’ 
frameworks, litigants in one circuit do not appear to receive more 
substantive rights than in another. 
 17 Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1392 (internal citations omitted); see Johnson, 409 
F.3d at 18–19 (“Probative similarity” requires proof that “a sufficient degree of similarity 
exists between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing work to give rise to an 
inference of actual copying. . . .  [I]n examining whether actual copying has occurred, a 
court must engage in dissection of the copyrighted work by separating its original, 
protected expressive elements from those aspects that are not copyrightable because they 
represent unprotected ideas or unoriginal expressions.” (internal citations omitted)); see 
also Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 18 See Johnson, 409 F.3d at 18 (“‘[P]robative similarity’ requires that the two works 
are ‘so similar that the court may infer that there was factual copying.’” (quoting Lotus 
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995))). 
 19 See Johnson, 409 F.3d at 18 (“The ‘ordinary observer test’ or, in a musical milieu, 
the ‘ordinary listener’ test, supplies a framework for gauging substantial similarity.”); 
Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1391. 
 20 Johnson, 409 F.3d at 18. 
 21 Id.; see also Repp v. Lloyd Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“Copyright caselaw has caused considerable confusion by the use of the term 
‘substantial similarity’ at two different points of the copyright infringement analysis . . . 
the term “probative similarity” should be used when referring to the initial burden of 
proving copying by establishing access and/or similarities.” (citations omitted)); 
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Telelvision, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen 
‘substantial similarity’ is used to mean the threshold for copying as a factual matter, the 
better term is ‘probative similarity,’ and that ‘substantial similarity’ should mean only the 
threshold for actionable copying.”). 
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II. MUSIC THEORY AND FUNCTIONALITY 
In order to understand the proposed model for harmony’s role 
in the substantial similarity test, some basic background 
knowledge of music and its treatment in the law is necessary.  The 
basic harmonic progressions are: tonic-dominant-tonic (I-V-I), 
tonic-subdominant-tonic (I-IV-I) and tonic-subdominant-
dominant-tonic (I-IV-V-I).22  This basic harmony is typically too 
unoriginal in law to justify the grant of monopolies through 
copyright protection.23  Virtually anyone, even with a limited sense 
of finger coordination, could replicate these simple harmonic 
patterns.  The notion underlying harmonic functionality could be 
expressed as follows—this simple, rudimentary harmony should be 
unprotectable as a matter of law not just because it lacks the 
requisite originality for copyright protection,24 but also because it 
may be considered “functional” as the term is understood in 
trademark doctrine. 
As such, this Article argues that something akin to the 
trademark doctrine of functionality should also be applied in the 
context of copyright law to deny protection to basic harmonic 
progressions on account of their functional nature.25  In the context 
of trademark law, the goal of which is to provide protection for 
marks that identify goods with their manufacturers, the doctrine of 
functionality has been applied to prevent manufacturers from 
obtaining control over useful product features as distinguishing 
marks.26  To provide manufacturers with the exclusive control of 
useful product features through any means other than patent 
protection would be to provide such manufacturers with an unfair 
monopoly advantage over their competitors.27  To take an 
 22 See Dahlhaus, supra note 1. 
 23 See 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.05[D]. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (defining the 
trademark doctrine of functionality); supra note 2; see also McIntyre v. Double-A Music 
Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (A “contribution” of “several bars of 
harmony” or the “addition” of “harmonic embellishments” are “technical improvisations 
which are common in the vocabulary of music . . . are de minimis contributions and do 
not qualify for copyright protection.”). 
 26 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164. 
 27 See id. at 164–65. 
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example, the doctrine of functionality would provide that even if 
consumers had come to identify the particular shape of a light bulb 
with a certain manufacturer, that design could not be protected if it 
played some role in the functioning of the light bulb (i.e., enhanced 
the light bulb’s brightness or reduced its power consumption).28  
To do so would provide the original light bulb maker an unfair 
advantage “by frustrating competitors’ legitimate efforts to 
produce an equivalent . . . [ligh 29
Similarly, for a song to be commercially successful, it must 
have some harmony.  The simpler the harmony, the better, since 
more fans could later recall the song and perhaps even replicate it 
in some way.  Most, if not all, commercial songs have a simple 
harmony at the songs’ core.  Hence, this Article argues that these 
simple harmonic progressions are akin to the functional features of 
a light bulb and should not be protectable under copyright law. 
However, a crucial distinction must be made: while simple 
harmonic progressions are typically the result of functional 
considerations, many songs, however, also contain another more 
sophisticated type of harmony beyond this basic tonal-functional 
harmony that can be generally referred to as a “fancy harmonic 
layer.”30  The sophisticated harmonic embellishments found in the 
fancy harmonic layer are dictated less by functional considerations 
and more by decisions of creative and artistic choice.  Thus these 
harmonic progressions are not functional by nature, and should be 
afforded the typical protections of copyright law.31 
This Article also contends that the current system of gauging 
infringement does not account for the acoustic properties of the 
categories it deems protected.32  An analysis of the relevant case 
 28 Id. at 165. 
 29 Id. 
 30 The term “fancy harmonic layer” refers to more sophisticated harmonies, i.e., those 
beyond the basic harmonic progressions enumerated supra in the text accompanying note 
22. 
 31 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006) (providing copyright protection for “musical 
works”); 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.05 (elaborating on the copyright protection 
provided for “musical works”). 
 32 See 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.05[D] (“It has been said that a musical work 
consists of rhythm, harmony and melody, and that the requisite creativity [for copyright 
protection] must inhere in one of these three.”). 
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law shows that courts avoid elaborating on the nature of specific 
harmonic progressions that potentially warrant copyrightability.33  
Instead, the courts prefer a quantum-of-creativity discussion, 
which is in the nature of legal conclusion rather than an 
explanation.34  One problem with this approach is that it does not 
define the status quo of a particular harmonic combination, and 
makes it impossible to predict the court’s decision in the future vis-
à-vis the same combination only in a different composition.  
Another problem is that this approach unwittingly shifts the focus 
from the exercise of a creative harmonic choice to the end-result of 
that exercise.35 
The new approach proposed by this Article advocates against 
the tendency to seek a uniform set of factors that would fit every 
substantial similarity analysis, while still defending the practice of 
musical dissection in determining extrinsic similarity.  The article 
also briefly addresses scholastic criticism of the test and comments 
upon the criticisms’ merits before discussing the role of juries in 
cases involving music.  Under the current system of determining 
infringement, the jury assesses the intrinsic similarity between the 
 33 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2005); Tempo Music, Inc. v. 
Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 34 See, e.g., Johnson, 409 F.3d at 23 (“The plaintiff has not presented any evidence 
contradicting his own expert’s assessment of the ubiquity of the III, II harmonic 
progression.  Virtually by definition, expressions that are common are also unoriginal.”); 
Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co.,  259 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2001); see also 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (noting that although 
originality does not require novelty, it does demand that an expression exhibit “at least 
some minimal degree of creativity”).  So it is here: this harmonic progression, which is a 
stereotypical building block of musical composition, lacks originality.  Note that in 
Johnson, the ruling may have been caused by the plaintiff expert’s omission or failure to 
underscore the fact that the III–II harmonic progression meets the minimum threshold of 
originality. See Johnson, 409 F.3d at 23.  The threshold is met because it reverses the 
conventional order of harmonic progression.  Traditionally, the harmony moves from 
subdominant to dominant group. See supra discussion in Part II.  Accordingly, ordinarily 
the II degree precedes III, since II is part of the subdominant group, and III is part of the 
dominant group.  In reversing the order of progression, the minimum degree of creativity 
should have been met. 
 35 See Tempo Music, 838 F. Supp. at 168 (“We reject the third-party plaintiff’s 
argument that ‘the proper focus in determining originality is not whether [the composer] 
exercised ‘creative choices,’ but on the result of those choices.’”). 
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plaintiff’s and defendant’s songs.36  Many factors impair a jury’s 
ability to determine the intrinsic similarity between two songs, and 
therefore litigants should not realistically expect jurors, under the 
current standard, to pass an informed judgment about the music’s 
expressive content. 
III. PROPOSED PARADIGM: THE FUNCTIONALITY OF HARMONY 
Part III of this Article will discuss the underlying basis for the 
functionality of harmony paradigm.  Succinctly explaining the 
acoustic phenomenon which spurred the development of harmony 
per se as the Western world knows it today, this Article 
demonstrates that in the type of music that is typically litigated, the 
commercial usefulness of harmony far exceeds its originality—
hence the norm of functionality. 
A. The Sound and its Perception 
The world of sound is a world of vibrations and numbers.37  
Scholars credited Pythagoras with the discovery of the numerical 
basis of a sonic vibration.38  Pythagoras observed that a sound 
 36 Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If plaintiff satisfies the 
extrinsic test, then the subjective ‘intrinsic test’ asks whether an ‘ordinary, reasonable 
observer’ would find a substantial similarity of expression of the shared idea.” (quoting 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994))); see also 
Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 37 See, e.g., Charles Taylor & Murray Campbell, Sound, in GROVE, available at 
OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/26289 (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2009) (discussing the multiple aspects of the sonic phenomenon). 
 38 See André Barbera, Pythagoras, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/22603 (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2009). 
Pythagoras’s importance for music lies in his purported establishment 
of the numerical basis of acoustics.  On passing a blacksmith’s shop, 
he is said to have heard hammers of different weights striking 
consonant and dissonant intervals.  He discovered that musical 
consonances were represented by the ratios that could be obtained 
from the musical tetractys: 1, 2, 3, 4.  The ratios are relations of string 
lengths or frequencies. . . .   A Pythagorean scale consists of 4ths 
subdivided in two tones plus the remainder. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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phenomenon could be represented through mathematical ratios,39 
and that certain ratios generated “pleasant” intervals and others 
produced “unpleasant” ones.40  For example, intervals formed 
from integers between 1 and 4 (tetractys) produced consonances, 
or pleasant sounding intervals.41  Conversely, the intervals formed 
from the ratios outside the tetractys generated dissonances.42 
During the Renaissance, when Hellenic ideals were infused 
with new life,43 the consonance group was expanded to include 
ratios created from integers between 1 and 6.44  This expansion 
marked the beginning for the major-minor dichotomy as we know 
 39 Id.; see Claude V. Palisca & Brian C. J. Moore, Consonance § 1, in GROVE, 
available at OXFORD,  http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/ 
music/06316. 
 40 The consonance, or “symphony,” in Pythagorean tradition should not be confused 
with the subjective perception of whether the interval sounds pleasant to a human ear.  
The tetractys had symbolic and spiritual connotations; it represented the cosmic harmony, 
which was extrapolated to the harmony between the human body and soul. See Barbera, 
supra note 38 (“According to the theory of the harmony of the spheres, the distances 
from the earth to the visible planets and sun, as well as the speeds with which the celestial 
bodies circle the earth, are in the same ratios as various musical intervals, especially those 
of the diatonic scale.”); see also Palisca & Moore, supra note 39. 
 41 See Palisca & Moore, supra note 39. 
The association of consonance with simple ratios goes back at least to 
the Pythagoreans of the 5th century bce, who used the term 
‘symphonies’ for intervals produced by string lengths in the ratios 
formed from numbers between 1 and 4.  These comprised the octave 
(2:1), the 5th (3:2), the octave-plus-5th (3:1), the 4th (4:3) and the 
double octave (4:1). 
Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See generally Lewis Lockwood, Renaissance, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/23192 (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2009) (discussing the Western music history in the context of sociological 
changes between the years of 1300 and 1600). 
 44 See Mark Lindley et al., Interval, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/13865 (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2009) (“[I]t was only in the 16th century that the simpler 5:4 and 5:3 ratios 
became the standard European theoretical ideal.  The change corresponded, albeit 
belatedly, to an earlier change in the practical status of 3rds and 6ths as consonant 
intervals.”); Palisca & Moore, supra note 39 (“Zarlino [in his 1558 treatise, Le istitutioni 
harmoniche] by extending the Pythagorean inner sanctum to the number 6 (senario), was 
able to admit the ratios 5:4, 6:5 and 5:3 but had to rationalize the minor 6th, 8:5, as a 
composite interval made up of a perfect 4th and a minor 3rd.”). 
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it in today’s music.45  Contemporary psychoacoustical studies 
show that “[a]s a rough rule of thumb, ratios involving integers 
greater than 6 are heard as dissonant, while intervals involving 
ratios less than 6 are heard as consonant.”46  Accordingly, there is 
a direct correlation between the latter ratios and the demands of 
mass music consumers for mundane forms of expression: a simple 
harmony, and a simple melody.47 
Indeed, for centuries the works of great composers pushed the 
definitions of consonance to the limits of tonality.48  However, 
despite the intellectual possibilities and virtues of impressionist,49 
neoclassical,50 or dodecaphonic51 systems, “the infantile demands 
 45 See generally Brian Hyer, Tonality, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/28102 (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2009)  (discussing conceptual categories in which the melodies and harmonies 
relate to the tonic pitch class, and the differentiation of the musical material through 
major and minor modes) [hereinafter Hyer, Tonality]. 
 46 Palisca & Moore, supra note 39, § 2.  The sensory theory of consonance explains 
our preference for simple ratios in two ways.  First, through natural tendency to minimize 
the “beats” effect, which is a kind of noise or interference between the harmonics of the 
two notes. See id.  “The second explanation is connected with the fact that action 
potentials (nerve impulses, ‘firings’ or ‘spikes’) in the auditory nerve tend to be 
synchronized to a particular phase of the stimulating wave in the cochlea or inner ear  
. . . .” Id. See generally David Fowler, Helmholtz: Mathematical Structure in Music, in 
MUSIC AND MATHEMATICS: FROM PYTHAGORAS TO FRACTALS 77, 83–87 (John Fauvel et 
al. eds., 2003) (providing a condensed discussion on consonance and dissonance 
phenomena). 
 47 See Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923). 
In a popular song, the composer must write a composition arranging 
combinations of these tones limited by the range of the ordinary 
voice and by the skill of the ordinary player.  To be successful, it 
must be a combination of tones that can be played as well as sung by 
almost any one. 
Id. 
 48 Hyer, Tonality, supra note 45. 
 49 See Jann Pasler, Impressionism § 1, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/50026 (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2009) (“In much of Debussy’s music, as in Impressionist pieces by Delius, Ravel 
and others, the composer arrests movement on 9th and other added-note chords, not to 
produce dissonant tension but, as Dukas put it, to ‘make multiple resonances vibrate.’  
This attention to distant overtones, particularly generated by gong-like lower bass notes, 
produces a new sense of musical space, in effect giving a greater sense of the physical 
reality of sound.”). 
 50 See Herbert Antcliffe & Barbara A. Renton, Wagenaar, Bernard, in GROVE, 
available at OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/ 
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of the popular ear”52 yearn for sounds produced from the lower 
integer ratios, a practice in effect since at least the sixteenth 
century.53  Faced with the market for increased simplicity, which 
can be reached by using a limited combination of sounds, the 
composers of mass consumer music are bound to hear virtually the 
same sound combinations in each other’s works.54 
29763 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (“Wagenaar’s compositions, in a style that can be 
described as neoclassical in its use of formal structures, modified to suit his artistic 
purpose, include tonal and polytonal pieces demonstrating lyrical melodic grace, finely 
wrought counterpoint and pungent harmonies.”); see also The Music Chamber—
Neoclassicism, http://library.thinkquest.org/27110/noframes/periods/neoclassicism.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2009) (“Neoclassicism . . . combined musical elements from the 
Classical Period with the newer trends that were emerging early in the twentieth 
century.”). 
 51 Dodecaphonic, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC (Michael Kennedy ed., 2d ed. 
rev.), available at OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/opr/ 
t237/e3021 (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) (“12 sounds.  Adjective describing the system of 
comp[osition] with 12 notes . . .  In the dodecaphonic scale the 12 notes are considered to 
be of equal status and are so treated.”). 
 52 Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (“It must be 
remembered that, while there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the 
musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile 
demands of the popular ear.”). 
 53 Palisca & Moore, supra note 39, § 2 (“[I]ntervals involving ratios less than 6 are 
[generally] heard as consonant.”). 
 54 See, e.g., Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 290 F. 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1923). 
Musical signs available for combinations are about 13 in 
number.  They are tones produced by striking in succession the white 
and black keys as they are found on the keyboard of the piano.  It is 
called the chromatic scale.  In a popular song, the composer must 
write a composition arranging combinations of these tones limited by 
the range of the ordinary voice and by the skill of the ordinary player.  
To be successful, it must be a combination of tones that can be played 
as well as sung by almost anyone.  Necessarily, within these limits, 
there will be found some similarity of tone succession. 
Id. 
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B. The Functionality of Harmony 
In music, the tonal-functional harmony55 is an outgrowth of the 
counterpoint56 and of its resulting polyphony.57  Distilled to basics, 
the idea behind harmony is relatively simple: harmony is a series 
of chords that have some musically logical58 relationship to each 
other.  Accordingly, a few triads59 played in a row will generally 
produce some simple or “block” harmony.60  This harmony is 
 55 See Dahlhaus, supra note 1. 
[T]he concept of harmony refers less to actual musical structures 
than to the structural principles underlying intervals and their 
combinations or chords and their relationships.  (In Riemann’s theory 
of harmonic function, a harmony is the essence of all chords having a 
like function and thus exists at a much more abstract level than 
chords with their inversions and notes ‘foreign to the harmony’.)  
However, harmony considered as a structural principle is just as 
much an intrinsic part of ancient and medieval music as it is of the 
tonal system of modern times.  The two-note consonance constituted 
the foundation of the old tonal system, the three-note consonance that 
of the new.  From the 18th century onwards, the scale of any key has 
been explained as being the result of a reduction of the three principal 
chords, the tonic, dominant and subdominant: C–E–G + G–B–D + F–
A–C = C–D–E–F–G–A–B–C. 
Id. 
 56 See Klaus-Jürgen Sachs & Carl Dahlhaus, Counterpoint, in GROVE, available at 
OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/06690 (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2009).   Counterpoint is “the combination of simultaneously sounding 
musical lines according to a system of rules.  It has also been used to designate a voice or 
even an entire composition . . . devised according to the principles of counterpoint.” Id. 
 57 See Wolf Frobenius et al., Polyphony, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/42927 (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2009). 
 58 Note that for a harmonic progression to sound appealing it must follow certain pre-
established rules of how to treat the dissonances and fundamental base; not any 
permutation will produce a consonant and eclectic harmony. See Palisca & Moore, supra 
note 39, § 2. 
 59 A Triad is “[a] chord consisting of three notes which can be arranged to form two 
superimposed 3rds.” Triad, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/28347 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009). 
 60 See Brian Hyer, Block Harmony, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/03290 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009) (“A homorhythmic accompanying texture in which harmonies are 
presented as simultaneous chords, often one per beat, below a more active and soloistic 
melodic part.”). 
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called tonal,61 because the chords exist in a hierarchy in which the 
main (or “tonal”) group of chords functions as a point of equipoise 
between the dominant and sub-dominant groups.62 
The harmony is also functional, because it serves as a support 
for melody or for a melodic figuration.63  Harmony anchors the 
melody into the primary key which functions as a point of 
reference to a certain pitch class, accompanies the melody into the 
secondary keys, and provides an aural context in which the listener 
can better distinguish the character of the melody.64  Further, 
because harmony functions as an accompaniment to the melody, it 
very seldom, if at all, could possess a value of an independent 
significance.65  As noted, the public seeks this simple tonal-
functional harmony to be a part of a “pop” song.66 
Further, because the tonal-functional system is based mainly on 
three triad groups,67 the number of possible variations in the 
 61 See Dahlhaus, supra note 1, § 1; Hyer, Tonality, supra note 45, § 1. 
 62 See Dahlhaus, supra note 1, § 1; Hyer, Tonality, supra note 45, § 1. 
 63 See Dahlhaus, supra note 1, § 1.  A parallel is noticeable between the principles 
underlying functionality of harmony in music and functionality doctrine in the context of 
the Lanham Act notwithstanding the observation that the two concepts deal with 
somewhat dissimilar categories: intangible music and tangible goods.  Functionality in 
music promotes harmonic continuity, which serves as a sui generis foundation for the 
melody and as melodic accompaniment. See id.  In trademarks, functionality protects the 
free competition in designing features demanded by the buyers regardless of the source of 
the goods’ origin. See generally Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th 
Cir. 1952) (stating that a particular feature is functional if it is an important ingredient in 
the commercial success of a product, and that the interest in free competition permits the 
imitation of such features in the absence of a patent or copyright).  As iterated in note 2, 
supra, there should be no equivocation per se between the term functionality as it relates 
to harmony and trademark law. 
 64 See generally David Fuller, Accompaniment, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/00110 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009) (defining accompaniment “[i]n the most general sense, [as] the subordinate 
parts of any musical texture made up of strands of differing importance”). 
 65 See id.; Dahlhaus, supra note 1, § 3(v). 
 66 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 67 The three main groups are the tonic, sub-dominant, and dominant groups. See 
William Drabkin, Degree, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/07408 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009) (“The other degrees are as follows: second, supertonic (this is the dominant 
of the dominant); third, mediant; sixth, submediant; and seventh, leading note.”). 
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system is scarce.68  Additionally, considering that the tonal-
functional practice existed since approximately the sixteenth 
century, to show that a certain harmonic progression has not been 
in the public domain is almost impossible.69 
Furthermore, even a cursory look at the hit charts shows that 
nearly all successful performers sing alongside harmonic 
accompaniment, suggesting that the public demands songs in 
which harmony is a feature.70  For better or worse, music has 
become a commodity subject to trade.71  Similar to goods, music is 
manufactured, designed to appeal to the largest audience possible, 
and tailored to specific audiences to achieve the greatest 
recognition, which is almost invariably measured in dollars.72  It, 
therefore, is reasonable to allow songwriters to benefit in the 
creation of music from functionality, a protection from which the 
makers of goods have already been benefiting. 
The Restatement of Torts states that a feature of goods is 
functional “if it affects their purpose, action or performance . . . it 
is non-functional if it does not have any of such effects.”73  Indeed, 
harmony affects the song’s purpose, because without harmony, 
 68 Because the tonic is “related” to submediant, subdominant is related to supertonic, 
and dominant is related to mediant, these enumerated harmonic progressions occupy the 
tonal-functional universe. See generally Dahlhaus, supra note 1. 
 69 See, e.g., Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 
1976); Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1936) 
[hereinafter Edward B. Marks]. But see Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 
2004) (insisting that the compared elements of the songs be found in the same field of 
music). 
 70 For a discussion of the history and importance of harmony, see Dahlhaus, supra  
note 1. 
 71 MILES, supra note 2, at 107 (“Pop music is a commodity which can be bought and 
sold in the marketplace.”). 
 72 See Richard Middleton et al., Pop § 1, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/46845 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Middleton, Pop].  That is not to say, however, that only 
consumerism molds the idiosyncrasies of “pop.” See id. (“The forms, themes and 
pleasures of most pop, then, are marked both by the effects of ‘consumerism’ and by the 
tensions resulting from a tilt in the structure of social feeling towards ‘youth’, ‘change’ 
and ‘modernity.’”). 
 73 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938) (“The determination of whether 
or not such features are functional depends upon the question of fact whether prohibition 
of imitation by others will deprive the others of something which will substantially hinder 
them in competition.”). 
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there would be merely a simple melodic line with some rhythm—a 
combination hard to sell in the marketplace.  Therefore, protection 
of the functional features in harmony makes little sense because it 
would discourage new composers from creating something that is 
demanded by the audience-consumers.  Albeit developed in the 
context of The Lanham Act,74 the courts have not transposed the 
doctrine of functionality from trademarks to music copyrights.75 
The simple, basic harmony or variation should not be 
protectable as it is functional.76  While courts have used various 
traditional copyright doctrines to decline copyright protection for 
trivial harmonic combinations,77 the problem with these doctrines 
is that they often disregard music’s syncretic nature in which every 
 74 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006).  “In a civil action for trade dress infringement under 
this Act for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts 
trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is 
not functional.” Id. § 1125(a)(3). 
 75 While this doctrine is not used in copyright, the courts do, however, speak of 
frequencies and commonalities of harmonic schemes. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 
1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) (The court must be “mindful of the limited number of notes 
and chords available to composers and the resulting fact that common themes frequently 
reappear in various compositions, especially in popular music. . . .  Thus, striking 
similarity between pieces of popular music must extend beyond themes that could have 
been derived from a common source or themes that are so trite as to be likely to reappear 
in many compositions.”); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[I]n a field 
such as that of popular music . . . all songs are relatively short and tend to build on or 
repeat a basic theme.”). 
 76 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“The 
functionality doctrine prevents . . . [the inhibition of] legitimate competition by allowing 
a producer to control a useful product feature.”). 
 77 See, e.g., Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding the I, IV 
harmonic progression not protectable due to its commonality); Tempo Music, Inc. v. 
Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing the traditional 
interpretation of harmony as unprotectable because it “is driven by the melody”); 
Intersong-USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding a certain 
harmonic progression unprotectable because it appears in many songs); McIntyre v. 
Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (describing plaintiff’s 
“inconsequential melodic and harmonic embellishments” as those which “are frequently 
improvised by any competent musician[,]” and finding that “[s]uch technical 
improvisations which are in the common vocabulary of music and which are made every 
day by singers and other performers, are de minimis contributions and do not qualify for 
copyright protection”); N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 
400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (observing that harmony “is achieved according to rules which have 
been known for many years” and that “[b]eing in the public domain for so long neither 
rhythm nor harmony can in itself be the subject of copyright”). 
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increment is inseparable from the whole composition and thus 
equally important.  The idea of harmonic functionality circumvents 
the aesthetics and focuses on the features that are demanded by the 
music consumers’ market.78 
When dealing with goods in the copyright context, the courts 
have come to employ the useful article doctrine to determine 
whether the useful features of a good are physically or 
conceptually separable from their purely aesthetic features.79  
Under the useful article doctrine, courts provide protection to those 
aesthetic features of goods that are separable from the goods’ 
useful applications, and decline protection where the aesthetic 
features are not separable from the goods’ useful features.80 
In the trademark context courts have used “the theory of 
‘aesthetic functionality’” to find that less strictly utilitarian and 
more ornamental “visually attractive and aesthetically pleasing 
designs [can be] . . . categorized as ‘functional’ and hence free for 
all to copy and imitate.”81 
Outside the musical milieu these approaches may be eminently 
correct, albeit if somewhat difficult to administer.82  However the 
 78 Note that there are genres in wide consumer demand, such as “techno” in which 
neither harmony nor melody are prominent features. See Will Fulford Jones, Techno, in 
GROVE, available at OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/ 
grove/music/47221 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 79 See generally 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.08 [B][3]. 
 80 See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“[P]laintiff’s mannequins of partial human torsos used to display articles of clothing are 
utilitarian articles not containing [physically or conceptually] separable works of art, and 
thus are not copyrightable.”); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 
989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that certain ornamental belt-buckles had decorative 
features that were conceptually separable from their utilitarian function and thus were 
eligible for copyright protection); 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.08 [B][3]. 
 81 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
7.79 (4th ed. 2008). 
 82 For discussion and criticism of the aesthetic functionality doctrine, see generally 
Mitchell M. Wong, The Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine And The Law Of Trade-Dress 
Protection, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1116, 1118–19 (1998).  For a criticism of the useful 
article doctrine and a suggested alternative approach to copyrightability, see generally 
Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in 
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 and see also 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.08 
[B][3] (discussing the inconsistencies and difficulties courts have faced in administering 
the useful articles doctrine). 
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useful article doctrine has only been applied in the context of the 
copyrightable subject matter category of “pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works”83 which is a separate and distinct category of 
copyrightable authorship from “musical works.”84  Moreover, the 
useful article doctrine has typically been applied to deny protection 
for objects that are useful in the strictest of utilitarian senses (i.e., 
bicycle racks,85 paper patterns used to cut dresses86) and has 
afforded copyright protection to objects whose use is merely for 
amusement or personal enjoyment (i.e., toys,87 pig-nose costume 
masks88).  Under such a discerning standard of utility, it is hard to 
imagine that the copyright useful article doctrine could be applied 
to deny copyright protection to the functional features of harmony. 
As for the trademark aesthetic functionality doctrine, however, 
in the case of music, where a song’s harmonic functionality can 
dictate its success in the marketplace, separating harmony’s 
functional features from its aesthetic features may be almost 
impossible and largely should not be required.89 
 83 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006); see id. § 101 (“[T]he design of a useful article, as 
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, 
and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently 
of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”); 1-2 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 2.08 [B][3] 
(providing an explanation of the useful article doctrine in the context of its discussion on 
the copyrightable subject matter category of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”). 
 84 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2). 
 85 Brandir Int’l Inc. v. Cascade Pac., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying 
copyright protection for the artistic and aesthetic qualities of a ribbon bicycle rack on the 
grounds that these qualities could not be conceptually or physically separated from the 
rack’s utilitarian function). 
 86 The Beverly Hills Design Studio v. Morris, 126 F.R.D. 33, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(“These patterns were used to cut fabric for the manufacture of garments.  They did not 
reflect . . . ‘artistic judgment exercised independently of functional influences’, but were 
functional products not eligible for copyright protection.”). 
 87 See Gays Toys v. Buddy L. Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[T]oys do not 
even have an intrinsic function other than the portrayal of the real item.”). 
 88 See Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 671 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“The utilitarian nature of an animal nose mask or a painting of the crucifixion of Jesus 
Christ inheres solely in its appearance, regardless of the fact that the nose mask’s 
appearance is intended to evoke mirth and the painting’s appearance a feeling of religious 
reverence.”). 
 89 Wong, supra note 82, at 1120 (“[A] feature that ‘affects the cost or value’ of an 
article is not necessarily ‘essential to [its] use or purpose.’  . . . Decorative, as opposed to 
utilitarian, features fall squarely within this unsettled area, thereby framing the aesthetic 
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Litigants, nonetheless, should be able to account for music’s 
purely functional features, because the manner in which music is 
sold and bought (whether on the streets or the Internet) makes 
music a commodity, an object of trade, a good.90  In the case of 
music, denying protection to the functional features of harmony 
outright avoids the potential pitfalls of the conceptual and physical 
separability tests and the distinction between the aesthetic and the 
functional as these doctrines would potentially be applied to 
musical works.  As such, litigants should not be forced to draw 
these distinctions in cases involving harmony, and protection 
should be denied for harmonies at the primary tonal level precisely 
because they are inherently functional. 
C. Musical Anatomy 
The harmony that goes beyond the triviality of primary tonal 
level and blocked chords is and should be protectable under 
functionality problem.”); see MCCARTHY, supra note 81, § 7.80 (noting the “[u]neven use 
of the aesthetic functionality doctrine in the modern courts”).  In his seminal trademark 
and unfair competition treatise, Joseph McCarthy goes on to comment that “[t]he notion 
of ‘aesthetic functionality’ is an unwarranted and illogical expansion of the functionality 
policy . . . .” Id. at § 7.81.  As McCarthy explains: 
Advocates of the theory of aesthetic functionality will often use the 
1938 Restatement’s example of a Valentine’s Day candy box in the 
shape of a heart to help prove their theory.  The assumption is that no 
one candy purveyor should have the legal right to exclusive use of a 
heart-shaped candy box and that only the theory of aesthetic 
functionality can accomplish the job of preventing such an unfair 
result.  My response is that there is no need to invent a theory of 
‘aesthetic functionality’ to achieve the desired result.  One way to bar 
a heart-shaped candy box from trade dress status is to invoke the 
traditional utilitarian functionality rule.  The heart shape is just as  
‘utilitarian’ from a marketing viewpoint as any engineering analysis 
of rectangular versus circular box sizes and shipping stability and 
cost of manufacture. 
Id. (citation omitted).  So it is with harmony: just as the design of a heart-shape box is 
functional for the marketing and engineering advantages it will provide the box in the 
marketplace, so too is the nature of harmony at the primary tonal level.  As such, 
harmony, just as a heart-shaped box in McCarthy’s example, should be afforded 
protection for its functional nature without having to resort to the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine. See id. 
 90 The proposition is not an invitation to reopen the door to treat copyright claims 
masked as claims for false designation of origin under the Lanham Act. See Dastar Corp. 
v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37–38 (2003). 
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copyright law.  In Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp.,91 a 
New York district court analyzed whether the harmony and revised 
melody in the instrumental version of Duke Ellington’s Satin Doll 
was protectable when used without lyrics.92  Billy Strayhorn’s 
estate argued that the rights to Billy’s two instrumental versions of 
Ellington’s Satin Doll belonged to Strayhorn and that Ellington 
owed royalties to Strayhorn.93  Ellington took the position that 
because harmony is in the common musical vocabulary, it is not 
protectable as a matter of law;94 but the court disagreed.95 
Instead of focusing on the merits of Strayhorn’s harmonic 
arrangement, the court took a shortcut to the final holding and 
interpreted Ellington’s position as an argument for a heightened 
originality standard, thus redirecting discussion toward distinction 
between originality and novelty.96  Pointing out that the creative 
process in choosing between harmonic chords suffices for purposes 
of the copyright protection,97 the court stated that unlike 
originality, novelty is not necessary for copyright protection.98 
Legal positivism aside, it is not possible to understand whether 
the court in Tempo Music achieved the “correct” result without 
having the benefit of substantial similarity analysis and dissection.  
Beyond mentioning in a somewhat truncated manner the experts’ 
opinions, the court did not compare elements allegedly copied, nor 
did it engage in a systematic analysis of protectable versus 
 91 Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp, 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 92 Id. at 164. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 168. 
 95 Id. (“The Court is not convinced that harmony is unprotectable as a matter of law.  
While we agree that melody generally implies a limited range of chords which can 
accompany it, a composer may exercise creativity in selecting among these chords.”). 
 96 See id. at 168–69 (“Originality does not signify novelty; a work may be original 
even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not 
the result of copying.” (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345 (1991)). 
 97 Id. at 169.  “This emphasis on creative process rather than novel outcomes is 
consistent with the standard in other jurisdictions which emphasize creative inputs 
beyond mere technical changes any skilled musician could make.” Id. at 169 n.11 (citing 
McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958)). 
 98 Id. at 168–69 (“Once it is understood that originality, for copyright purposes, looks 
to creative process rather than novel outcomes or results, it becomes clear that harmony 
can, as a matter of law, be the subject of copyright.”). 
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unprotectable musical textures, or otherwise explain the 
compositional merits of Strayhorn’s arrangement.  To a trained 
listener, Strayhorn’s arrangement seems to go beyond trivial when 
it employed dissonant harmonies,99 but the same dissonances exist 
in the orchestral version of Ellington’s Satin Doll.  Yet the court 
does not expressly distinguish via dissection the harmonies in the 
two pieces.100  Hence, in answering that harmony is not 
automatically unprotectable as a matter of law, the Tempo Music 
court does not give a guide as to which elements within 
Strayhorn’s harmony were legally determinative—an important 
issue, which only raises further questions.101 
The inherent subjectivity of the aural perception demands a 
side-by-side comparison of the competing works through 
dissection.102  However, an overzealous use of dissection may lead 
to fragmentation of the work beyond recognition—a practice 
branded as hyper-dissection.103  In this respect, the opinions in 
Swirsky v. Carey104 and Johnson v. Gordon105 are illustrative.  
While the Ninth Circuit in Swirsky overruled the lower court’s 
excessive dissection of a musical block,106 the First Circuit in 
Johnson shrugged at the appellant’s objection to hyper-dissection 
and affirmed the lower court’s decision.107 
 99 The tension of the parallel seventh chords, when juxtaposed to the relaxed chromatic 
parallelisms of the triads with perfect fifths in the bass, generates a fresh and even novel 
effect. 
 100 See id. at 167–72. 
 101 See id. at 165–72. 
 102 Cf. Roodhuyzen, supra note 8, at 1418–19 (addressing the pitfalls created by the 
substantial similarity test). 
 103 See Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2005).  Hyper-dissection involves 
“overlooking the forest for the trees . . . [when] the court [does] not see the overall 
similarity between [the songs] because it analyzed fragments of the two and ignored 
similarities that were recognizable only within a wider context.” Id. 
 104 Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 105 Johnson, 409 F.3d at 12. 
 106 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 847–49. “[N]o approach can completely divorce pitch 
sequence and rhythm from harmonic chord progression, tempo, and key, and thereby 
support a conclusion that compositions are dissimilar as a matter of law.” Id. at 848. 
 107 See Johnson, 409 F.3d at 26.  A possible, if at all needed, reconciliation between the 
two cases may be that the extent of the probative similarity finding in Johnson was 
greater than it was in Swirsky, and therefore the Swirsky court did not have to go too 
deeply in the dissection—an argument based on the “inverse ratio” rule that the more 
evidence of probative similarity is present, the less evidence is necessary to prove 
VOL19_BOOK2_GHERMAN 2/18/2009  2:51:24 AM 
2009] HARMONY AND ITS FUNCTIONALITY 505 
 
The reluctance of the courts to announce a uniform set of 
factors that would satisfy the extrinsic test has been frustrating.108  
It would be difficult for a court to create a definite set of factors 
that would function as a litmus test for every copyright 
infringement action because each author of an original work has a 
unique creative process.  For example, in Three Boys, a set of five 
elements were found dispositive: “(1) [T]he title hook phrase 
(including the lyric, rhythm, and pitch); (2) the shifted cadence; (3) 
the instrumental figures; (4) the verse/chorus relationship; and (5) 
the fade ending.”109  Indeed, it would be uncanny to claim that 
application of these five factors to the songs in Swirsky or Johnson 
should lead to a similar end-result as in Three Boys; after all, not 
all songs may have title hook phrases, or shifted cadences, or fade 
endings. 
Judges cope with the tests’ uncertainties in their own ways.  
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Swirsky took a holistic approach 
to dissection; observing the trial court’s omission from analysis of 
certain elements like genre,110 “key, harmony, rhythm, and 
tempo,”111 the Ninth Circuit in Swirsky stated that even if some 
elements are individually unprotected, they may still be protected 
when combined.112  No definite clues followed as to a combination 
of which and of how many elements would satisfy the test.  Rather, 
substantial similarity. See id. at 18–26 (discussing the requirements for probative and 
substantial similarity and dissecting the songs); Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 844–45 (“Carey 
conceded that she had a high degree of access to [plaintiff’s song].  Swirsky’s burden of 
proof of substantial similarity is thus commensurately lowered.”); see also Rice v. Fox 
Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Under the ‘inverse ratio rule,’ we 
‘require a lower standard of proof of substantial similarity when a high degree of access 
is shown.’” (quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 
2000)). 
 108 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 849 (acknowledging refusal to announce a uniform set of 
factors to be sufficient for extrinsic test). 
 109 Three Boys, 212 F.3d at 485. 
 110 See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848. 
 111 See id. at 848 n.13 (“In order to perform a song exactly, the musician would need 
information about key, harmony, rhythm, and tempo—the type of information not 
included in the district court’s comparison.”). 
 112 See id. at 848. 
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the court just noted that, “concentration solely on pitch sequence 
may break music down beyond recognition.”113 
By contrast, the court in Johnson delved into the painstaking 
comparison of the compositional elements of the songs at issue.114  
In a laudatory analysis the court explained the technicalities of the 
extrinsic test: it outlined the interplay between the 
compositional/musical importance and the legal importance of the 
song’s structural segments that litigants could use as a prediction 
for the types of musical combinations that will or will not satisfy 
the extrinsic test.115  For instance, the court stated that, even by 
using transposition, raising melody by a perfect fifth, and then 
using inversion and retrograde, the plaintiff was still far from 
proving a “meaningful degree of similarity” between a two-bar 
melodic slice.116  Further, analyzing the next two measures, the 
court noted that harmonic progression from III to II constituted a 
“stereotypical building block” and that the plaintiff was unable to 
rebut its own expert’s assessment of “ubiquity of [the] III, II 
harmonic progression.”117 
The difference in which the courts in Swirsky and Johnson 
treated scenes a faire arguments is notable.118  When the defendant 
in Swirsky argued that a certain allegedly copied portion of the 
melody was not protectable because it resembled the lines from the 
folk songs For He’s a Jolly Good Fellow and The Bear Went Over 
the Mountain, the court countered that the comparisons are “not in 
the same relevant ‘field’ of music,” thus stripping an apparently 
valid argument of its force.119  Moreover, the opinion added that 
the common element must be found in more than two songs.120 
 113 Id. at 848 n.13.  Perhaps an understatement, since the district court’s opinion 
focused on more than the pitch sequences. See id. at 847–48. 
 114 Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 21–24 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 21. 
 117 Id. at 23. 
 118 “Scenes a faire analysis requires the court to examine whether [component] 
similarities that plaintiffs attribute to copying could actually be explained by the 
common-place presence of the same or similar [components] within the relevant field.” 
Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 850 (citing Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d. 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 119 Id. at 850.  Note that the scenes a faire argument may come at a cost to the 
defendant/composer’s reputation.  The defendant may need to forget his own professional 
pride and assert that the allegedly copied portions in his music were taken from the public 
VOL19_BOOK2_GHERMAN 2/18/2009  2:51:24 AM 
2009] HARMONY AND ITS FUNCTIONALITY 507 
 
By contrast, when the plaintiff in Johnson charged that the 
pitches 5-5-4-3-7-1 used in the melody were replicated by 
defendant as 5-5-4-3-2-1, the court simply pointed that a 5-4-3-2-1 
contour is very common,121 such as in Row, Row, Row Your Boat, 
specifically the melodic portion corresponding to the words “life is 
but a dream.”122  The Johnson court, in contrast to the Swirsky 
court, analyzed the comparable pitches despite the fact that they 
were not in the same “relevant ‘field’ of music.”123 
Finally, in dissecting the compositions, some courts addressed 
the commonality of the key or tonality in which the plaintiff and 
defendant’s songs were written.124  Arguably, the key of the song 
is irrelevant, because nowadays almost all music is equally 
tempered,125 and will sound the same in any key to listeners who 
domain and are unoriginal as a matter of law.  For just as in the case of the plaintiff, the 
defendant’s legal right rests on the interest of financial gain, and the risk of being looked 
down upon in musical circles is likely to be outweighed by the risk of paying thousands 
of dollars in damages. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) 
(“The plaintiff’s legally protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musician but 
his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions which derive from the 
lay public’s approbation of his efforts.” (citations omitted)). 
 120 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 850.  For more demanding views see Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d 539, 543–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting harmonic progression used in both 
compositions so common as to be “found in songs in all genres”); and also McRae v. 
Smith, 968 F. Supp. 559, 566 (D. Col. 1997) (stating that chord progressions found in 
both compositions “are the most common chord progressions in all of the music of 
Western civilization”). 
 121 Johnson, 409 F.3d at 21.  Under the Ursatz theory of Heinrich Schenker, all pieces 
of tonal music have a basic structure of either 3-2-1, 5-4-3-2-1, or 8-7-6-5-4-3-2-1. See 
MIDDLETON, STUDYING POPULAR MUSIC, supra note 2, at 193. 
 122 Johnson, 409 F.3d at 21–22. 
 123 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 850. 
 124 See, e.g., Tisi, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 548; Arnstein, 82 F.2d at 277. 
 125 Mark Lindley, Equal Temperament, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/08900 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009).  Equal temperament is: 
A tuning of the scale based on a cycle of 12 identical 5ths and with 
the octave divided into 12 equal semitones, and consequently with 
3rds and 6ths tempered, uniformly, much more than 5ths and 4ths.  
Equal temperament is now widely regarded as the normal tuning of 
the Western, 12-note chromatic scale. 
Id. 
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do not possess an absolute pitch.126  Accordingly, a coincidence in 
the key or tonality does not have a tendency to show that a copying 
is more or less probable.127  Analyzed from a different side, an 
infringer could transpose a protected element into a different key, 
and even though now there will be two different tonalities, the 
copyright would obviously be infringed. 
D. Critiques 
Several criticisms were directed at the current framework for 
determining substantial similarity.128  Some commentators 
addressed the courts’ fundamental reliance on the outdated notions 
of melody, harmony and rhythm, which are not reflective of 
 126 Richard Parncutt & Daniel J. Levitin, Absolute Pitch, in GROVE, available at 
OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/00070 (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
The ability either to identify the chroma (pitch class) of any 
isolated tone, using labels such as C, 261 Hz or do (‘passive’ absolute 
pitch), or to reproduce a specified chroma—for example, by singing 
or adjusting the frequency of a tone generator—without reference to 
an external standard (‘active’ absolute pitch (AP): Bachem, 1937; 
Baggaley, 1974; Ward, 1982).  Both skills may be called ‘tone-AP’.  
Absolute pitch may also involve recognizing whether a familiar piece 
is played in the correct key (passive), or singing a familiar song in the 
correct key (active); this skill is known as ‘piece-AP.’ 
. . . . 
Only about one person in 10,000 claims to have tone-AP 
[absolute pitch] (Profita and Bidder, 1988). 
Id. 
 127 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). 
 128 See, e.g., Autry, supra note 14, at 118–41 (discussing the effects of various 
similarity standards); Alan Korn, Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring 
Substantiality of Contemporary Musical Expression, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 489, 489 (2007) (discussing the inadequacy of the substantial similarity test in the face 
of ever-changing expression in modern “jazz, avant-guard, world music, and . . . hip-
hop”); Yvette Joy Liebesman, Using Innovative Technologies to Analyze for Similarity 
Between Musical Works in Copyright Infringement Disputes, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 331, 334–35 
(2007) (critiquing the subjectivity resulting from the current applications of substantial 
similarity tests); Aaron Keyt, Comment, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism 
Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 441–43 (1988) (addressing deficiencies in the current 
substantial similarity test for its unresponsiveness to the social context in which certain 
works were created and the music theory behind them). 
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contemporary musical expression.129  These reproaches are mostly 
correct.  Indeed, the courts deal with contemporary music using 
outdated measuring sticks; after all, outside the courtroom the 
definitional ambit of melody and harmony have changed 
dramatically since the landmark music copyright infringement  
case of Arnstein v. Porter, decided by the Second Circuit in 
1946.130  However, the compositional essence of the music ending 
up before the courts is not new: those compositions invariably use 
tonal-functional harmony at their core, and have a traditional song-
like melody—all common features of songs since the eighteenth 
century.131  Notwithstanding the critiques and the fact that the 
courts base their decisions on somewhat outdated norms of melody 
and harmony, the substantial similarity test adequately responds to 
the litigants’ current needs. 
So long as the litigated music is grounded in principles of 
traditional harmony and melody, it does not matter that a 
classically-trained expert is hired to testify about a “pop” or “rap” 
genre, even if the expert does not have a formal academic training 
or experience in the particular genres.132  The demand for experts 
with long Curricula Vitae (“CV”) caters to the assumptions that the 
longer the CV, the better the expert appears in the eyes of the judge 
and the jury.133  Similarly, pure pragmatism suggests that the 
longer the CV, the higher the chance that a judge would favorably 
rule on the preliminary matters of admissibility and on the expert’s 
“helpfulness” in assisting the jury, and the higher the possibility 
 129 See, e.g., Korn, supra note 128, at 489–91 (discussing the fact that the courts’ 
general “definition of music [as melody, harmony and rhythm] fails to account for unique 
methods of musical expression that exist beyond those narrowly drawn boundaries”); 
Keyt, supra note 128. 
 130 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946); see 4-13 NIMMER, supra note 
7, § 13.03 [E][3][A][i] (discussing the significance of Arnstein).  The more recent 
decision in Swirsky v. Carey in 2004 in the Ninth Circuit focuses more on using expert 
testimony to satisfy an objective standard. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 849. 
 131 See Norbert Böker-Heil et al., Lied § IV, in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/16611 (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2009). 
 132 See, e.g., GEORGE ROCHBERG, THE AESTHETICS OF SURVIVAL: A COMPOSER’S VIEW 
OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY MUSIC 88–89 (2005) (discussing the fact that all music (both pre 
and post twentieth-century) “is rooted in the same basic prototype”). 
 133 See Autry, supra note 14, at 120–21. 
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that the jury would give greater weight to the expert’s testimony at 
the time of deliberation.134  After all, having recognition in an 
underground rap club is not the same as heading a music theory 
department at Berkeley or NYU.135 
In another criticism of the substantial similarity test, Yvette Joy 
Liebesman, a law clerk at the time, noted the inherently subjective 
and inconsistent results that stem from the application of the 
current substantial similarity test.136  To balance the test’s 
subjectivity, Liebesman invited the creation of either a “Mega-
Element Analysis” test,137 or alternatively a “Mathematical 
Modeling Analysis” test, to be considered in determining the level 
of similarity between competing works.138  Although conceptually 
admirable inventions, these models will likely hit practicality 
obstacles.  The software database that both of these tests would 
rely on may need reconfiguration for every new and unaccounted 
 134 Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (providing that the qualification of an expert 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court); FED. R. EVID. 104(e) (explaining that the rule does not limit a party’s right 
to introduce “evidence relevant to weight or credibility”); United States v. Haro-
Espinosa, 619 F.2d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 135 Notwithstanding, now there are pop and jazz scholars in the field of music theory 
such as Mark Butler who wrote a book analyzing techno/house music and whose 
expertise in the area could be perceived as more fitting to the subject matter.  See 
generally MARK J. BUTLER, UNLOCKING THE GROOVE: RHYTHM, METER, AND MUSICAL 
DESIGN IN ELECTRONIC DANCE MUSIC (2006). 
 136 See Liebesman, supra note 128, at 333–35. 
 137 Id. at 345 (“Although analyzing a song under the broad, artistic categories of 
harmony, melody, structure, and rhythm may be a good starting point for determining the 
level of similarity between songs, it should be expanded.  [T]he current breakdown leads 
to contradictory results and conflicting expert testimony.  One solution is to further 
subdivide each of these categories into a large number of artistic elements for a detailed 
dissection of the songs in question.  [Liebesman] refer[s] to this proposed test as Mega-
Element Analysis.”). 
 138 Id. at 349–56 (“Using the physics of music, a math and physics-based copyright 
infringement test . . . [which may be referred to as a] Mathematical Modeling Analysis  
. . . test, could be developed to analyze the distinct characteristics of a musical tune.”).  A 
mathematical approach to music has found some supporters. See Bozena Kostek, 
Perception-based Data Processing in Acoustics: Applications in Music Information 
Retrieval and Psychophysiology of Hearing, in 3 STUDIES IN COMPUTATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE 137 (2005) (purporting to show the way soft computing methods could be 
applied to avoid ambiguous decision making in musical signal processing and pattern 
classification). 
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musical invention.139  Absent such reconfiguration, the program 
may show the existence of novelty or originality, where in fact 
none exists, and vice versa.140 
Additionally, there are questions as to how the proposed 
mathematical models would distinguish between legal and musical 
originality, two standards which must be distinguished.  While the 
constitutional protection141 of musical works extends only to 
works that are original,142 originality is a value-laden notion.  In 
law, the originality threshold for copyright protection is quite 
low.143  By contrast, in the music community, the standard for 
originality is high, and is more akin to legal novelty.144  A work 
could be considered utterly unoriginal from a musicological 
perspective, yet benefit from copyright protection.145  It is very 
 139 See id. at 345–47, 354 (showing the proposed tests’ reliance on music databases). 
 140 For a discussion on how the proposed tests would work and some of the legal 
obstacles to their implementation, see Liebesman, supra note 128, at 344–62. 
 141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 142 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship” including “musical works.”); see Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“Originality is a constitutional requirement.”). 
 143 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5664 (“The phrase ‘original works of authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is 
intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by the 
courts under the present [1909] copyright statute.  This standard does not include 
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge 
the standard of copyright protection to require them.”). 
 144 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 84–86 (7th ed. 2007) (distinguishing the 
copyright standard of originality from the patent requirement of novelty).  This is 
generally true regardless of whether the music is part of a classical domain, or belongs to 
jazz, rap or hip-hop modes of expression.  Historically, the nineteenth century notions of 
originality regarded reworking one’s own music as unoriginal, since “the invention of 
new melodies and new effects had replaced the skilful manipulation of given material as 
the sign of a great composer.” J. Peter Burkholder, Borrowing § 9, in GROVE, available at 
OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/52918pg9 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 145 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46.  The Court in Feist explained: 
[t]he requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble or obvious it might be’.  Originality does not signify novelty; 
a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works 
so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying.  To 
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tempting for litigants to confuse the two standards, so as to make it 
harder on the opponents to show that their work is legally original 
while arguing that from a musicological perspective it is 
composition
IV. INTRINSIC SIMILARITY: DO WE WANT TO SEE THE JURY? 
Just as a visual work of art occupies space, music occupies 
time.  Music is a process, and any musical discourse implies time 
passage.146  The listener is expected to last through the entire 
performance not only to resonate with the overall expressive idea, 
but also to comprehend the relationship between the music’s 
discrete structural parts.147  A musical discourse is never all in one 
place and in one time, and hence any listening experience involves 
memory—specifically recognition.148 
Once a piece has been presented to a listener, the listener could 
potentially pass a judgment on it.  Yet the inherent abstractness of 
aural perception makes articulation of one’s listening experience 
difficult.149  Absent training, the listener is less likely to remember 
and recognize the presence or absence of the key original elements, 
and this is especially so if the listener does not belong to the type 
of audience toward which the music is geared.150 
illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the other, compose 
identical poems.  Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, 
hence, copyrightable. 
Id. (citing 1 NIMMER, supra note 7, §1.08[C][1] (1990)); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936)). 
 146 See W. Jay Dowling, Perception of Music, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF 
PERCEPTION 470–71 (E. Bruce Goldstein ed., 2001) (“Music consists of sound organized 
in time, intended for, or perceived as, aesthetic experience.” (citation omitted)). 
 147 See id. 
 148 See Diana Deutsch et al., Psychology of Music § II(4)(ii), in GROVE, available at 
OXFORD, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/42574pg2 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (“Recognition is a process that operates in perception to match 
incoming information to previously stored information.”). 
 149 See Dowling, supra note 146. 
 150 For an insightful discussion on musical perception, see JANE O’DEA, VIRTUE OR 
VIRTUOSITY? EXPLORATION IN THE ETHICS OF MUSICAL PERFORMANCE 4–17 (2000); see 
also Autry, supra note 14, at 123. 
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But can litigants realistically expect that random people in the 
jury box can pass an informed judgment on the music’s expressive 
content?  Music communicates through symbols arranged in time; 
in a way, the musical language dissects and arranges time into 
segments.151  If the listener understands the musical language, he 
should also be able to interpret the expressive content embedded in 
the music.152  The music speaks through combinations of pitches, 
rhythm, meter, timbre, organizational form and many other 
structural elements.153  These combinatory elements are 
representational of the style, genre and composer.154  However, 
when the listener is unable to categorize the elements into familiar 
structures, the listener’s musical memory declines and the person 
cannot recognize the composition’s expressive content.155  
Accordingly, a juror’s familiarity with the specific expressive 
elements is quite important for the juror to recognize the particular 
similarities or dissimilarities between the plaintiff and defendant’s 
songs.156 
The musical vocabulary escapes our daily conversations.  
While subjects such as emergency rooms, civil rights, or criminal 
courts pervade the media and coffee-shop parlance, the notions of 
harmony, melodic motifs and tonality bypass our lives.  The 
ordinary juror is expected to learn to distinguish between key 
musical elements and to understand their inter-relationships during 
the trial.  Such expectation is utopian, however, considering a lack 
of general familiarity with the necessary musical concepts and 
considering the abstractness of aural perception.157 
Potentially one could counter that juries have traditionally 
decided cases dealing with unfamiliar notions in medical 
malpractice, securities litigations and the like.  Nonetheless, the 
level of familiarity in those areas is still much greater, because the 
 151 See generally Bruno Nettl, Music,  in GROVE, available at OXFORD, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/40476 (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2009) (discussing the concept of music). 
 152 See id. 
 153 See id. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See Deutsch, supra note 148. 
 156 See id. 
 157 See Autry, supra note 14, at 116. 
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underlying disciplines are based on the laws of physics, chemistry 
or jurisprudence with which the general public is acquainted 
through the mass media, education or both.  On the other hand, 
rules of music, such as harmony and counterpoint, are outside of 
the general public’s knowledge.  It therefore appears that the jury’s 
task in analyzing music is markedly different from other areas.158 
The jury’s difficult task, if performed correctly, is worthy of a 
well-trained ear.  A juror, as an “ordinary listener” and “an 
ordinary person of reasonable attentiveness,” upon listening to the 
plaintiff and the defendant’s works should be able to determine 
whether “the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s 
protectable expression.”159  In doing so, the juror is supposed to 
pay special attention to the works’ aesthetic appeal and be willing 
to overlook eventual disparities between them.160  Surely, the test 
uses jurors’ susceptibility to sensory consonance,161 as well as 
takes in stride the fact that after several hours of trial for an 
untrained juror’s ear those two songs will blend together and sound 
relatively the same.  Lastly, to add to the mix, there is a factor of 
 158 See id. at 113 (discussing the unique nature of the subject matter under copyright 
law). 
 159 See Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 160 See id. (“The key is whether ‘the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the 
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard [the works’] aesthetic appeal 
as the same.’” (citing Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 
(2d Cir. 1960)). 
 161 See Palisca & Moore, supra note 39. 
‘Sensory consonance’ refers to the immediate perceptual 
impression of a sound as being pleasant or unpleasant; it may be 
judged for sounds presented in isolation (without a musical context) 
and by people without musical training.  ‘Musical consonance’ is 
related to judgments of the pleasantness or unpleasantness of sounds 
presented in a musical context; it depends strongly on musical 
experience and training, as well as on sensory consonance.  These 
two aspects of consonance are difficult to separate, and in many 
situations judgments of consonance depend on an interaction of 
sensory processes and musical experience. 
. . . . 
Psychoacoustic studies have usually emphasized sensory 
consonance, and tried to explain it in terms of the physical nature of 
the sounds and the way the sounds are analyzed in the peripheral 
auditory system. 
VOL19_BOOK2_GHERMAN 2/18/2009  2:51:24 AM 
2009] HARMONY AND ITS FUNCTIONALITY 515 
 
atonality to which modern music appears to adhere.162  The studies 
show that listeners are more likely to recall tonal material than 
atonal material.163  Accordingly, the jurors are much more likely to 
err in distinguishing between the two sections in post-modern jazz 
than between two tonal-functional pieces. 
While litigants possess a right to bring their case before a jury, 
the multitude of factors that hinder the jury’s job, such as the 
peculiarities of the acoustical and sensory phenomena associated 
with music164 and the vagaries of the jury system, suggest that the 
resolution of the case before a jury needs to be sparing.  In music 
even a musicologist cannot completely and objectively extricate 
from the process of listening.165  What then can be said of a lay 
juror performing a trained professional’s job? 
CONCLUSION 
The low threshold of originality has often been used as an 
assault on commercial successes of those who were simply better 
at delivering popular musical features to the masses.  This article 
focuses on one of such popular features—harmony.  More 
specifically, this article focuses on the way in which the idea of 
harmonic functionality shields potential defendants from the 
above-mentioned assaults.  Today, without a well-defined test to 
determine whether a particular harmony is copyrightable, the 
courts simply pick a side by deciding, intuitively or otherwise, 
whether a particular harmonic progression is minimally creative. 
Id. 
 162 See Anthony Watkins, Scale, Key, and Contour in the Discrimination of Tuned and 
Mis-Tuned Approximations to Melody, 37 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 275, 276 
(1985). 
 163 Id. at 282. 
 164 See Palisca & Moore, supra note 39 (discussing the “psychoacoustic factors” of 
music). 
 165 Even while deconstructing a song, the musicologist’s inner ear is always at work and 
the song literally “sounds” within the expert’s head as she performs the analysis.  In this 
light the Swirsky defendants’ comment as to Dr. Walser’s perception of the work as it 
sounded to him makes perfect sense. See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 847 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
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The proposed paradigm of harmonic functionality provides a 
new turf on which the debate regarding copyrightability of 
harmony can take place.  This paradigm first and foremost 
recognizes the commercial value of basic tonal harmony.  In the 
context of the extrinsic similarity test, the proposed paradigm 
explains harmony from historical and psycho-acoustic 
perspectives.  In the context of the intrinsic similarity test, the 
same psycho-acoustic rationale is offered to explain the inevitable 
judgment flaws that could stem from submitting a case before an 
uninitiated jury. 
Instead of looking for a uniform rule that would cue litigants to 
the right number of factors to satisfy the extrinsic test, this Article 
suggests the focus shift to the structural elements of each song and 
the analysis of each one from the acoustical perspective.  Given the 
fact that dissection calls for experts in a very specialized field of 
musicology, composition and music theory, the suggestion is for 
practitioners to work closely with musical experts.  The 
practitioner is also invited to pay special attention to areas in which 
musically important elements are misaligned with the legally 
important elements. 
This Article devoted a special place to the idea of harmonic 
functionality and to the idea that the musical marketplace demands 
songs written with simple harmony—hence, greater leeway should 
be given to defendants in justifying their simple harmonic choices.  
Further, it stated that mere equivocation between functionality of 
the tonality and the legal doctrine of functionality is unwarranted.  
The Article posited that a key to prove or disprove substantial 
similarity in music should lie in the natural acoustic 
phenomenon—a concept unsusceptible to political or legal 
changes.  The proposed paradigm of harmonic functionality rests 
in the nature of sound itself, and fits into the substantial similarity 
analysis framework the way that analysis already exists.  The 
paradigm demands neither a change of established legal principles 
nor a specialized knowledge in its comprehension. 
Finally, the Article proposed that the extrinsic similarity factors 
could not be divorced from the idea that the application of those 
factors is inherently subjective, and that the subjectivity is rooted 
as much in the nature of the acoustic properties of the sound as in 
VOL19_BOOK2_GHERMAN 2/18/2009  2:51:24 AM 
2009] HARMONY AND ITS FUNCTIONALITY 517 
the perception of the listener.  As to intrinsic similarity, the Article 
showed and justified its skepticism of the juries’ ability to work 
with novel musicological concepts and offer a valid answer to the 
legal question posed in the context of intrinsic similarity test. 
 
